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From the literature on resistance to persuasion in advertising, much is known about
how people can resist advertising by adopting resistance strategies, such as avoidance,
counter-arguing, and selective attention (e.g., Fransen et al., 2015b). However, the
role of emotion regulation and bodily expression in resisting persuasion is so far
underexplored. This is a surprising observation if one considers that at least 40%
of advertisements use positive emotions (i.e., happiness) to persuade people to like
the ad, brand, and product (Weinberger et al., 1995). In this article we present a
framework in which we apply previous knowledge and theories on emotion regulation
and embodiment to the process of resistance to persuasion. In doing so, we specifically
address the role of facial expression in the course of resistance. The literature and
findings from our own research lead us to propose that people can resist persuasion
by controlling their facial expression of emotion when exposed to an advertisement.
Controlling the expression of emotions elicited by an ad (for example refusing to smile)
might be a fruitful way to resist the ad’s persuasive potential. Moreover, we argue that co-
viewers can affect embodied resistance to persuasion. Showing the viability of embodied
resistance to persuasion is relevant in view of the fact that ads trying to persuade us
by addressing our positive emotions are ubiquitous. Embodied resistance might help
people to cope with these induced positive emotions in order to resist advertisements
and might therefore work as a novel and effective strategy to resist persuasion.
Keywords: resistance to persuasion, embodied emotion regulation, facial expression, consumer behavior,
enjoyable advertisements
INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW
When we think about persuasion in a consumer context, we often think about advertising. This is
a justified association because advertising is a powerful and lucrative persuasion tool with revenues
forecasted to grow to $536 billion worldwide in 2015 (Magna Global, 2014). Advertisements often
serve to increase consumption without consideration given to the needs of prospective buyers.
Therefore, many observers have raised significant concerns about the potentially undesirable effects
of advertising and the persuasive tactics that marketers use to engage audiences (Boush et al., 1994;
Calfee and Ringold, 1994; Darke and Ritchie, 2007). People sometimes believe that brands provide
them with dishonest or distorted messages in their advertisements and feel inclined to stand up to
these practices. They thus seem to desire control over whether or not they are persuaded by media
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and advertising. Although people may know that marketers
create ads designed to influence their behavior (Friestad and
Wright, 1994; Wright et al., 2005), some persuasion tactics
nevertheless pose a distinct challenge. Therefore, some may
want more tools in their repertoire to resist these types of
advertisements.
The present paper is inspired by the apparent inequity between
research on the effectiveness of advertisements on the one
hand, and the limited amount of research on the tools to resist
them on the other. From the perspective of emotion, many
strategies that people use to resist persuasion are quite broad.
Marketers, meanwhile, deftly play on specific emotions in their
ads. Therefore, aiming resistance at emotions that are often
used in advertising is important. In other words, a productive
line of inquiry might lead to ways of helping people to cope
with (positive) emotions used to elicit behaviors beneficial to
marketers. We therefore endeavor to uncover concrete tactics for
dealing with specific emotions like happiness in the service of
resisting persuasive advertisements.
In the following sections, we begin with a summary of the
usage and effects of enjoyable advertisements as a persuasive tool,
followed by a discussion of resistance toward persuasion. Next,
we present our propositions regarding embodied resistance to
persuasion grounded in the specific context of advertising and we
provide first empirical support for these from studies conducted
in our own lab. Finally, we discuss the framework’s implication
for the theory and practice of persuasive communication and its
relation to existing models.
ENJOYABLE ADVERTISEMENTS
The use of enjoyable advertisements is omnipresent; about 40%
of all advertising is intended to be enjoyable and humorous
(Weinberger et al., 1995). Amusing advertisements can be defined
as “all forms of smile-inducing stimuli” that are persuasive and
designed to induce attitude change (Duncan, 1979, p. 302).
Amusement in advertisements has proven highly effective in
shaping people’s attitudes toward promoted products. Eisend’s
(2011) meta-analytic test of humor in advertising credits affect
with a more primary role than cognition. Eisend specifically
proposes that humor enhances “hot” cognitions in general (where
positive cognition outweighs negative cognition) and reduces
negative cognitions through distraction effects. Humor may also
evoke generic positive responses (Gulas and Weinberger, 2006)
and lead to transfer of affect through evaluative conditioning
(De Houwer et al., 2001). By employing humor, amusing
advertisements enhance many of the typically studied outcome
variables in advertising research. Eisend (2009) concluded in his
overview and meta-analysis of the effects of humor in advertising
that the use of humor, in general, enhances attitudes toward
the ad, positive affect, attention, cognitive positive responses,
and recognition. Since positive emotions and humor are used
extensively in advertising and often result in positive effects
from the perspective of marketers, it is pertinent to focus
on diminishing the effects of amusement and humor when
motivated to resist persuasion.
RESISTANCE TO PERSUASION
We define resistance to persuasion as a usually motivated attempt
to withstand persuasive attacks, conforming to the use of the
concept by other researchers (e.g., Zuwerink and Cameron,
2003). Much is known from the literature regarding the strategies
people employ to resist persuasion. Fransen et al. (2015b) recently
proposed three types of resistance – avoidance, contesting, and
empowering – to categorize the strategies adopted by people to
resist the effects of advertising. Avoidance strategies consist of
avoiding the ad altogether or only paying attention to those parts
of a message that confirm existing beliefs. Contesting strategies
entail a set of approaches that actively counter specific elements
of the ad (e.g., counter arguing, source derogation, message
derogation), while empowerment strategies focus on confirming
existing attitudes (e.g., attitude bolstering and social validation).
Fransen et al. (2015a) have then latter added one more type,
biased processing, which refers to processing a message in such
way that it fits existing attitudes and behavior or reduces it’s
relevance. Further, Kirmani and Campbell (2004) and Knowles
and Linn (2004) proposed their own frameworks of resistance to
persuasion, which we will not review here as we chose to present
the most recent conceptualizations, i.e., Fransen et al. (2015a,b).
What is relevant for our reasoning here is that none of
these frameworks and proposed strategies deals specifically with
resisting the positive emotional or affective responses that are
often elicited by advertisements and have been found to increase
persuasion. Because the use of positive emotions in ads is
ubiquitous and effective, the study of how consumers can resist
persuasion by focusing on the emotions in the ad is clearly
worthwhile.
Emotions and Embodiment in Regulation
for Resistance
Although researchers know that marketers try to persuade people
by using positive emotions, there is insufficient knowledge on
how to resist these kinds of ads. Companies use amusing ads
to influence us, and more to the point, to make us smile
with enjoyment, which may subsequently results in persuasion.
On this account, we propose that consumers might protect
themselves against advertising’s effects by “resisting” specific
emotions that ads induce as part of their persuasive potential.
They might accomplish this resistance by regulating their
emotions when exposed to an ad (e.g., not smiling) away from the
effects targeted by the ad. The literature supports the assumption
that emotion regulation may find a viable starting point in the
bodily expression of emotion, as we will argue below.
In a special issue on embodiment, Krishna and Schwarz
(2014) presented recent findings demonstrating that people’s
attitudes and intentions are often embodied, at least partially. The
implication is that the body plays a role in making up people’s
minds. Bodily states or changes in bodily states serve as sources
of information when forming attitudes and intentions (Herbert
and Pollatos, 2012). In the context of advertising, embodiment
means that people smile at an amusing ad and interpret the
related feelings of happiness as information to evaluate the ad
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and the promoted product. In other words, smiling at an ad
causes us to like it more. When seeking to resist ads of this
type, self-regulating this almost reflexive smiling response might
ultimately reduce liking for the ad. We propose that people
can resist advertising effects through modulating their “default”
bodily response to the ad, including emotions targeted by the
ad and the ensuing attitudes. We will refer to this process as
embodied resistance to persuasion.
Moreover, the literature on persuasion and resistance reveals
an emphasis on the individual consumer at the expense of
other perspectives, such as group effects. Ads, like most forms
of television programming, are often consumed in company,
e.g., at home with family relatives, or friends. Ads that attempt
to persuade using emotion or humor may derive added effect
from emotion sharing in co-viewing persons. Consequently, a
reasonable proposition might be that resistance to persuasion
can likewise derive benefit from sharing emotion regulation
across co-viewing individuals. We propose more specifically
that mimicking emotional expressions of other viewers is key
to shared emotion and shared regulation of emotion. Shared
emotion regulation may be relatively easy because the individual
viewer of an ad is “supported” by a co-viewer. Expanding the unit
of analysis from the individual to the group, we speculate that
under some conditions shared emotion regulation transforms
into joint resistance to persuasion. In sum, we suggest embodied
emotion regulation as a viable, new strategy for resistance to
persuasion that can also be shared among co-viewing consumers.
EMBODIED RESISTANCE TO
PERSUASION
How does resisting enjoyable advertisements by suppressing
facial expression of happiness function in detail? We explain this
in more detail in the theoretical framework below (summarized
visually in Figure 1). We introduce each of the components and
state the main tenets of embodied resistance in the subsequent
sections.
Emotion
Embodied resistance to persuasion is a particular form of
emotion regulation, namely regulation in the service of
resistance. We first must define what we mean by emotion,
facial expression, appetitive attitudes, and emotion regulation,
mainly by singling out the definitions used from alternative
theoretical approaches. Research on emotion has been dominated
by Ekman’s (1972) Basic Emotion Theory. New evidence (e.g.,
see Russell et al., 2003; Barrett et al., 2011; Lewinski, 2015c),
however, has challenged this well-established theory, especially
its claim that the commonly understood emotions are each
discrete phenomena, category bounded, easy to produce, and
readily recognizable (Russell, 2003; Barrett, 2006). We chose
the componential conceptualization of emotion as an alternative
that, like the basic emotion view, permits labeling emotions and
expressions as categories, but unlike Basic Emotion Theory does
not restrict the categorization of any emotion to a set of basic
labels. On the contrary, emotions can be labeled according to
FIGURE 1 | Embodied resistance to persuasion.
outcomes of an ongoing process of appraisal of the emotional
stimulus, giving rise to an essentially open set of labels. Obviously,
any traditional basic emotion labels are not excluded from these
outcomes.
Our framework has its starting point in Scherer’s (2004,
2009) componential process model of emotions which conceives
emotions as synchronized reactions of modules that operate in
interdependency (Scherer, 2001). As with all emotion theories,
affect is the foundation of emotion. Emotion is thus comparable
to a luxury variant of affect: it contributes to affect a number of
component emotion processes notably (1) an elaborate appraisal
of the stimulus, including feeling and action tendencies as
component processes, and (2) preparation for action. Scherer’s
model conforms to the appraisal-action schema observed in all
major emotion theories. However, in our use of the componential
model, the importance of the action component is especially
pronounced. We subscribe to a premise not explicit in Scherer’s
model, namely that action readiness is a sine qua non for
emotion (Frijda, 2007). We explore these concepts in more detail
below.
Facial Expression
Facial expressions of emotion are semi-universal sequences of
facial muscle contractions associated with the emotional state
of a person. The traditional view of Basic Emotion Theory
considers these expressions discrete, innate, and culturally
universal (e.g., Ekman, 1972; Ekman and Cordano, 2011).
However, evidence concerning the relationship between emotion
and facial expression subverts the notion of basic emotion
categories being related to fixed expressions (e.g., Jack et al.,
2012; see Fernández-Dols, 2013 for a review). Recent social
and psychological constructionist approaches (e.g., Russell, 2003;
Barrett, 2009; Mesquita, 2010) propose that distinct emotions
do not have singular, unique manifestation in facial expression,
and are likewise not considered natural kinds associated with
dedicated brain circuits.
We consider in particular that the set of traditional basic
emotion expressions may be part of the much larger or indeed
open array of emotion–expression combinations. For instance,
one may safely assume that a smiling person is in a happy
mood (e.g., Reisenzein et al., 2013). However, uncertainty arises
when it comes to what aspects of emotion are “expressed”
through a smiling face. Following the logic of functional
accounts of emotion, facial expressions have been argued to
reflect forms of action readiness (Frijda, 2007). The following
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practical example illustrates the use of attending to functional
aspects of facial expression. Imagine someone observing you
smiling intensely while watching an enjoyable commercial on
television. This observer cannot be sure about your feelings
at that particular moment but probably infers that when you
are pulling your lip corner up (i.e., smiling), it means you
are feeling happy. Frijda and Tcherkassof (1997) would argue
that you are not only smiling and feeling happy, but that you
are also expressing favorable action tendencies to approach
the commercial. Marketers and advertisers have taken note
of this relationship because they are interested not only in
how consumers emotionally respond to an advertisement, but
probably even more so in how consumers’ feelings relate
to behavioral tendencies toward the commercials, products,
and brands. Following the action tendency view of emotion
expression, we address the general question: can we tell from
facial expression whether consumers faced with an advertisement
have a particular action readiness toward the advertised product?
More to the point is the question: do they want it? We
subscribe to the hypothesis that facial expression of emotion
reflects a state of action readiness (Frijda and Tcherkassof,
1997). In addition, we argue that action readiness (Frijda et al.,
1989) in viewing ads takes the form of appetitive attitudes (as
defined in Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975) toward ads, products, and
brands.
Appetitive Attitudes
Fishbein and Ajzen’s (1975), Ajzen and Fishbein (1980) definition
is the starting point for our conceptualization of attitudes as
action-oriented emotional responses. An attitude is the sum of
the beliefs about the outcome of one’s behavior with regard
to the attitude’s object. Ads, brands, and products can be
objects of attitudes and emotions. Eagly and Chaiken (2007)
recently defined attitudes as specific beliefs, namely evaluations
of experience with the object. Attitudes represent a tendency
to “evaluate a particular entity with some degree of favor or
disfavor” (Eagly and Chaiken, 2007, pp. 598–599). Its property of
a favorability evaluation is why attitude may be called appetitive.
Eagly and Chaiken (2007) distinguish three evaluative
components in attitudes: cognition, affect, and behavior. These
can be mapped onto the components of emotion. Cognition and
affect evaluation correspond with appraisal of the object and
global action motivation. For example, Breckler (1984) showed
that affect measures correlated with physical distance taken to
an object. The behavioral evaluation component of attitudes
corresponds with what exactly one emotionally would like to
do with the object. For instance, a readiness of approach to an
ad evaluated as funny is specified as a tendency to engage in
interested exploration, to pay attention, be with the ad, identify
or care for the brand, possess the product and others (see
Frijda, 2007). In recent years, attitudes, too, have been considered
embodied inclinations, that is, attitudes involve a readiness of
the body to act according to the evaluation (Niedenthal et al.,
2005).
In the realm of advertising, the ad itself, the brand,
and product purchase intentions are objects of appetitive
attitudes. Because the model of emotion adopted here involves
synchronized rather than strictly subsequent emotion component
processes, we can only loosely sketch the temporal aspect of the
emotional process. While viewing an amusing ad, typically a
readiness to approach arises in the wake of or simultaneous with
its appraisal as funny. In addition, while viewing or immediately
following an ad, this approach motivation corresponds to
distinct appetitive attitudes, each having their own behavioral
implementations. From our embodied persuasion perspective, we
propose, they include (1) immediate liking for the ad – involving
a desire to attend it to the full and enjoy it; (2) brand liking –
involving a tendency to identify with the brand – to associate the
self with it; and (3) purchase intention – involving the tendency
to put forth effort and invest resources to possess the product.
Regulation of these emotions and their subsequent effects on
appetitive attitudes might be crucial in persuasion and resistance
processes.
Emotion Regulation
Emotion regulation is a conscious or unconscious sequence
of steps taken to control or change emotions. The process
of emotion regulation starts when internal or external stimuli
trigger, through a semi-stable individual threshold, the affective
appraisal. The cultural- and individual-specific patterns of self-
regulatory actions lead to modification of the default response
and hence final behavioral outcome (Gross and Thompson,
2007). Many types of emotion regulation have been reported (e.g.,
see Brans et al., 2013). Reflection, rumination, and distraction
are examples of emotion regulation strategies, but we focus here
on the two most general ones: antecedent- and response-focused
strategies (Gross, 2002).
Cognitive reappraisal is an antecedent-focused strategy.
Cognitive reappraisal, as a down-regulating strategy, changes
the perception of emotional events to become more objective
and analytical, decreasing felt emotion. For example, someone
who has recently lost a parent can think, “Dying is natural
to life and it happens sooner or later.” Up-regulation leads
to perceiving events in a subjective and involved manner,
which increases felt emotion (Lazarus and Alfert, 1964). As
a cognitive strategy, reappraisal modifies both appraisal and
action readiness. Importantly, cognitive reappraisal is capable
of increasing resistance to temptation. For example, Leroy
et al. (2012a,b) found that reappraisal could make a task more
appealing and temptation less attractive, thus aiding in resisting
temptations.
Expressive regulation is the response-focused emotion
regulation strategy that can either suppress or amplify outward
signs of inner feelings (Gross and John, 2003). Suppression of
bodily expressions has an inhibitory function and is generally
associated with poorer well-being and psychological functioning
(e.g., Svaldi et al., 2012). Amplification has an excitatory
function, as it intensifies the organism’s physiological responses.
People experience stronger emotions when activation of the
sympathetic nervous system is amplified (Demaree et al., 2004).
As the name implies, expressive regulation taps more directly
into the expression of emotion than cognitive reappraisal
does.
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Returning to our case of positive emotions provoked by
enjoyable ads, we propose that amusing ads typically lead to
an appraisal as “funny” and attractive, related to an approach
motivation. This appraisal and the ensuing action readiness
might be regulated, working toward controlling one’s attitude
with respect to the amusing stimuli, e.g., an ad. Assuming
such self-regulation is feasible, emotion regulation is a tool that
consumers could adapt for purposes of their own “defense”
against persuasive advertising. From this perspective, we believe
that our study of emotion regulation will contribute substantially
to the literature of resistance to persuasion. Emotion may be
regulated through adjusting one’s thought patterns, feelings, or
expressions. From those three ways, expression regulation is
crucial to embodied emotion regulation, a concept discussed
below.
Embodied Emotion Regulation through Facial
Expression
We posit that bodily expression is a privileged point of
application for emotion regulation. A general argument for this
assertion is that emotions as a whole (including attitudes as
emotional responses) are themselves embodied. All component
systems of emotion appraisal, global motivation, and responses,
that is, specific action tendencies and expressions have been
shown to be affected by instructions or implicit cues leading to
different body postures (Niedenthal et al., 2005). Therefore, it can
be expected that the control of bodily expressions can affect all
other emotion components.
Next, several arguments exist in favor of specifically facial
expression as a privileged nexus of emotion regulation among the
bodily concomitants of emotion. Facial muscles are hypothesized
to have direct, two-way connections with the experienced
and expressed emotion (Friesen and Ekman, 1983). Facial
expression regulates emotion strength because facial expression
feeds back on felt emotion intensity (Leventhal, 1984). Facial
efference theory (Zajonc, 1985; Adelmann and Zajonc, 1989;
Zajonc et al., 1989) takes as a starting point the well-
known fact that facial musculature is controlled by afferent
input originating in the brain’s emotion centers and adds to
this that, in turn, facial musculature activates efferent neural
output to the emotion centers. Research in support of facial
efference theory presents compelling biological evidence of
facial muscle contractions influencing affective experiences by
regulating blood flow (most prominently in the nasal area) to the
brain.
The facial feedback hypothesis goes one-step further than
postulating an efferent influence of expression on feeling.
Indeed, this hypothesis is a “causal assertion that feedback from
facial expression affects emotional experience and behavior”
(Buck, 1980, p. 813). Strack et al. (1988) found (however,
see the latest replication of Wagenmakers et al., in press),
for example, that a forced smile resulted in higher humor
appreciation. Zajonc (1985, p. 16) went on to demonstrate
that “facial muscles act as ligatures on facial blood vessels and
thereby regulate cerebral blood flow, which, in turn influences
subjective feeling.” For example, Zajonc et al. (1989) asked
participants to read aloud stories containing ü (U-umlaut),
a vowel that involves action of the corrugator muscle and
nostril constriction. Those two movements are typically part
of negative emotion expression. As predicted, reading aloud
“Jürgen,” “füchse,” and “hühner” lead to higher forehead
temperatures in contrast to stories containing “Peter,” “hunde,”
and “katzen,” because hypothetically the utterance of ü caused
an airflow cooling the brain. This efferent influence presumably
caused differences in experienced emotion. Participants reported
liking the non ü-story more even when participant origin,
content recall, or interest in German language were controlled
for.
In sum, embodied resistance to persuasion could in principle
deploy other means than facial expression or facial expression
alone (e.g., breathing slowly or shaking the head in “no” gesture),
but facial expression is an essential, arguably privileged and
up to now most researched component of embodied emotion
regulation. Therefore, we focus our theorizing mainly on facial
expression.
Shared Emotion Regulation
Emotion regulation often occurs in the presence of others. We
propose that a special form of embodied emotion regulation
is mimicking others’ facial expression and that facial mimicry
is more spontaneous than emotion regulation. Response- and
antecedent-focused emotion regulation is typically private. On
the other hand, people often view ads together. One way, then,
that emotion regulation might be extended from the isolated
individual to a social situation involving a co-viewer is through
subconscious mimicking of facial expression.
Facial mimicry is the action of specific muscles’ regions in
response to others’ facial expressions (Bush et al., 1989). This
phenomenon occurs automatically and spontaneously whenever
another person is co-present and visible. The mere perception
of facial expressions of others’ emotions activates observers’
facial muscles – as measured by facial electromyography – that
correspond to the perceived emotion (Dimberg, 1982; Lundqvist,
1995). Facial mimicry occurs fast – within 300 ms (Dimberg
et al., 2002) – and it may even be an innate aspect of perceiving
others (Niedenthal et al., 2005). Importantly, we adopt Bush
et al.’s (1989, p. 32) definition of facial mimicry because it
involves the process of mimicking, which modulates the “(. . .)
subject’s own expressive displays rather than one-to-one mimicry
outcomes”.
We propose that mimicry combined with facial feedback
results in shared emotion. An example is that when two smiling
persons mimic each other, mutual feelings of liking are enhanced
(for a review, see Lakin et al., 2003). As far as the mimicked
other is regulating their emotion involving facial expression,
the perceiver will follow the other in the regulation. Through
this process, expression of emotion and its regulation in one
individual will affect co-viewers and vice versa. Thus, facial
mimicry may be the vehicle for interpersonal sharing of emotion
but also of interpersonal sharing of regulation.
Competent consumers may deploy shared emotion regulation.
For instance, imagine that a parent’s disapproving facial
expression in reaction to an ad of appealing but sugar-rich
chocolate bar is mirrored by a change in the expression of a
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child watching the parent. Owing to properties of facial feedback,
the child’s initially positive facial expression is down regulated,
leading to suppression of the child’s positive feelings toward the
amusing advertisement of an unhealthy but appealing chocolate
bar. In line with this example, Rychlowska et al. (2014) showed
that blocking mimicry made true and false smiles look the same.
Thus, blocking facial mimicry (or showing opposite expression)
may reduce children (or adults’) ability to accurately interpret
emotional signals delivered by the ad and hence decrease the ad’s
intended persuasive impact.
In Summary
We propose that the complete process involved in embodied
resistance to persuasion is the following: in the default situation
of viewing a properly enjoyable ad, consumers feel a substantial
degree of happiness, as typically they do not regulate their
emotion in any way. The contents of the amusing advertisement
are appraised as amusing, and a corresponding appetitive
action readiness is automatically incited. These antecedent
components cause emotional responses indicative of happiness.
One is the subjective feeling of happiness, another is its
expression through facial movement, and a third is appetitive
attitudes – specified forms of the readiness to pleasantly
engage with the ad, brand, or product. Should a consumer
be inclined to resist amusing ads, response-focused emotion
regulation that suppresses appetitive attitudes will apply first
to the facial expression response, because conscious control
of facial expression is easy in comparison to other response
systems. Likewise, we argue that in the event a consumer
applies antecedent regulation, facial expression will again be
primarily affected for the same reason, namely that facial
expression is relatively easy to hold in check. Because of the
interrelatedness of emotional response systems and, perhaps
more particularly, the relatedness of facial expression with
the appetitive attitude response system, suppression of facial
movements propagates to lower feelings of happiness and
appetitive attitudes. Through a feedback mechanism, suppressed
facial expressions of happiness also influence (1) antecedent
components of the emotions, i.e., appraisal of the ad as funny,
and (2) the emotional approach tendency toward the ad.
To the degree that this mechanism persists, the consumer
exhibits embodied resistance to persuasion. When the ad is
part of a co-viewing experience, facial mimicry contributes
to shared emotion regulation. Mimicry involves changes in
the consumer’s facial movement that is targeted by the ad,
propagating subsequently to appetitive attitudes through facial
feedback. Mimicking facial expressions compatible with the
amusing ad enhances the target consumer’s happiness and
attitudes toward the ad, brand, and product, while mimicking
ad-incompatible facial expressions will suppress happiness and
attitudes.
Empirical Evidence for Embodied
Resistance to Persuasion
The empirical literature already consists of some research
supporting the basic tenants of embodied resistance to
persuasion. We review some of those studies below, which
come from our own lab. We chose facial expression and emotion
regulation as the focus of our studies because, as argued before,
one prominent form of bodily expression is facial expression and
another prominent form of self-regulation is emotion regulation.
Therefore, we focus on resistance toward persuasion by facial
expression manifested in emotion regulation and facial mimicry.
The latter phenomenon expands the notion of embodied
emotion regulation to social situations of individual consumers
watching ads in the company of others. Our primary aim is thus
to highlight the role of facial expression in suppressive emotion
regulation for embodied resistance. The first, basic question
is whether facial expression reliably predicts attitude change.
The second question is whether emotion regulation of facial
expression results in resistance toward persuasion. The third
question is whether a shared form of emotion regulation – facial
mimicry – influences facial expression and therefore attitudes of
the consumers. In sum, the three testable hypotheses, we propose
are:
During exposure to an enjoyable ad:
• H1: Facial expression of happiness predicts intensity of
appetitive attitudes;
• H2: Suppressing facial expression of emotion helps
consumers in downward regulation of appetitive
attitude;
• H3: Mimicking other consumers’ incompatible
expressions (incompatible-mimicry) inhibits target
consumers’ facial expression of happiness and
subsequently their appetitive attitudes.
In most of our studies presented below, participants were
exposed to 30 s enjoyable video advertisements while their
facial expression was estimated by automated facial coding
software – FaceReader (for technical details and validity
measures see Lewinski et al., 2014a). FaceReader’s estimation of
intensity of facial responses were afterward related to consumers’
attitudes toward the ad and buying intentions. The majority
of the experiments were carried out in cloud-based FaceReader
Online through MTurk, which heightened the experiments’
ecological validity in comparison to standard lab experiments as
participants were recorded in their own homes using their own
computers as in a standard ad watching situation.
In Lewinski et al. (2014b), we demonstrated that the intensity
of facial expression predicts the intensity of consumers’ appetitive
attitudes in response to enjoyable advertisements. In that
experiment participants viewed amusing advertisements. An
emotional response to the ads was assumed to involve Frijda’s
(2007) action tendencies, such as approach and be with the ad
and the brand, and to possess displayed articles. In this study,
approach and be-with tendencies were operationalized as ad
liking (Phillips, 2000) and brand liking (Chattopadhyay and
Basu, 1990). Participants were recorded watching three popular
high, medium, and low amusing video advertisements. Facial
expression during exposure to the commercials was coded using
FaceReader. Ad and brand liking were measured afterward. In
the high and medium, but not in the low amusement conditions,
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positive correlations were found between happiness scores and
appetitive attitudes (i.e., attitude toward the ad and the advertised
brand). No such correlations were obtained for any other basic
emotion (sadness, anger, surprise, fear, disgust) in any conditions.
In a similar vein, Lewinski (2015a) showed that facial expressions
of speakers, coded using FaceReader, predicted the number of
video views on a YouTube channel, 8 months after, controlling
for baseline views. Specifically, more of facial expression of
happiness and sadness (both approach tendency emotions) and
less of surprise expression (ambivalent emotion as to approach
tendency) correlated with higher popularity of the video (as
defined by video views), an outcome variable similar to ad
liking. We propose that we have found initial support for the
hypothesis that facial expression not only reflects communicative
intent, feeling, mood, or appraisals, but may also equally reflect
appetitive attitudes.
In Lewinski et al. (2015, February), we tested consumer
resistance to persuasion through embodied emotion regulation
in seven facial coding experiments. Across seven experiments,
we showed that response- and antecedent-focused emotion
regulation decreased (increased) positive (negative) responses to
a variety of advertisements. In five experiments with amusing
advertisements, we demonstrated a causal mediation path from
emotion regulation to expression and further down to attitude
change, although we did not fully replicate the same pattern for
disgusting ads. Specifically, we found that expressive suppression
and cognitive reappraisal had similar inhibitory effects on facial
expression of happiness, which subsequently led to lower positive
attitudes about the ad, brand and intention to buy. We assume
that those lowered attitudes on the side of the consumer are
indicative of a successful resisted persuasion attempt. Even
though, in those experiments, other resistance to persuasion
strategies (e.g., source derogation) were not compared directly
with emotion regulation strategies, three experiments introduced
effort in emotion regulation as an explanatory variable. Those
subsequent experiments showed that the effort in not feeling
happiness or not feeling anything (i.e., emotion regulation) was a
significant predictor of intensity of facial expressions, and hence
resisting persuasion depended on it, which in turn meant that
the more consumers tried to regulate their emotional experience,
the better off they were (i.e., more successfully resisted the
advertisement).
So far, the viewing situation was limited to the individual
consumer watching an ad in isolation. In Lewinski (2015,
Unpublished, June) and in Lewinski et al. (2016), we added
tests of shared ERP where we demonstrated effects of facial
mimicry on consumers’ attitudes and intentions in three
experiments. In this study, we simulated a co-viewer using
an avatar. Across three experiments, we demonstrated that
during exposure to an amusing advertisement, shared emotion
regulation modified consumers’ happiness and subsequently
their appetitive attitudes. Specifically, we found that consumers’
incompatible mimicry – manipulated through a “disgusted”
avatar – decreased consumers’ felt and expressed happiness,
which in turn caused lower attitudes and intentions. In one
of the experiments, we included an eyetracking manipulation
check to rule out the possible confounding effect of the presence
of avatar. To precisely manipulate facial mimicry in the main
studies, we developed an innovative method of a virtual avatar
embedded into an advertisement, which was meant to reflect
participants’ anticipated facial movement pattern. We concluded
that resistance to persuasion is enhanced by the presence of a
skeptical co-viewer expressing their negative attitudes through
facial expression.
Importantly, all support from empirical data described here
came from experiments with random assignment and with
a sample drawn from a representative American population
(thus not a student sample). This means that any alternative
predictor, such as the use of additional resistance strategies by
subjects or sociodemographic status was spread equally across the
conditions and hence cannot explain the findings. Further, the
type of advertisement tested in the experiments, which contained
different types of content, was judged as amusing and intended
to evoke generic laughter responses. This is relevant in light of
research on evaluative conditioning and the impact of resistance
motivations as discussed by Sweldens et al. (2010) or Fransen
et al. (2015a).
The studies reviewed above are a first empirical test of
our framework concerning embodied resistance to persuasion.
However, more empirical studies are needed in order to test the
more general framework as well as the specific role of different
expression systems, different types of ads and different types of
attitudes (e.g., implicit attitudes).
IMPLICATIONS
Theory
We believe that our focus on emotion regulation as a
resistance strategy contributes to filling the surprising lack of
conceptualization on the role of emotion and embodiment
in resistance to persuasion processes. As revealed in the
introduction, only a handful of resistance strategies have been
identified. So far, none of these strategies is emotion-specific (e.g.,
Knowles and Linn, 2004; Fransen et al., 2015a,b). Comprehensive
theorizing modeling the dynamic, sequential, and componential
nature of emotion and expression in persuasion is even more
scant. In the current paper, we applied existing knowledge on
embodiment and emotion regulation to the process of resistance
toward persuasion. The widely known Approach–Avoidance
Model of Persuasion (Knowles and Linn, 2004) includes only
so-called Alpha and Omega strategies for attitude change
(respectively making the message more attractive or focusing
on reducing resistance to it), both of which lack an explicit
emotion component. A recent paper by Fransen et al. (2015a)
reporting three different types of resistance strategies (avoidance,
contesting, and empowering) does not include emotion as a
prominent component. To address this shortcoming in the
literature on resistance to persuasion, we presented a new type of
strategy that consumers may use to resist persuasion of (amusing)
advertisements by regulating their own emotional and bodily
responses. We explicitly revealed the mechanisms of embodied
resistance to persuasion as well as its boundary conditions and
specific elements.
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The presented framework has further immediate implications
for the theory of resistance to persuasion. For the first time, we
consider the effects of a resistance strategy specifically tailored
to the emotional content of an advertisement. We propose that
positive attitude effects of amusing advertisements might be
counteracted through different forms of cognitive reappraisal and
expressive suppression, as well as incompatible facial mimicry.
We furthermore argue that a model of regulation and resistance
effects needs to take the expression of emotion into account.
A second contribution of the ERP framework is that it
incorporates the body into consumers’ self-awareness and
self-regulation. The possible underuse of embodied emotion
regulation is somewhat ironic given the immediate, permanent
accessibility of the resource in question. Our bodies link our
internal perceptions and actions to situations and stimuli in
the world. In principle, individuals have exclusive control over
their bodies’ movements. The body is the primary and most-
trusted source of information on external situations and internal
states, and an ever-available instrument to act. In some situations,
controlling the body may be easier than controlling the mind,
as in the case of cognitive depletion (Wheeler et al., 2007).
Competent consumers might recognize that they can to a large
extent be master of their thoughts and emotions because these
are embodied and situated.
Emotion Regulation
In our empirical studies we made a distinction between two
slightly different ways of regulating emotions, one through direct
instruction and another through facial mimicry as explained in
the overview of experimental studies. We proposed that the two
work in a similar manner but we do not exclude the possibility
that there are important differences. It could be that response-
focused emotion regulation (expressive modulation) influences
the expression and hence attitudes both upward and downward.
However, facial mimicry could have suppressive effects only. One
possible explanation for this qualitative difference could be that
when consumers’ expressions are already compatible, they do not
feel the need to mimic one another in order to up-regulate their
experience. However, that reasoning would contradict findings by
Raghunathan and Corfman (2006). Another explanation would
be a simple ceiling-effect, which could be tested by including
more neutral or ambiguous advertisements instead of only
amusing ads. In any case, this issue is left as an open question
that awaits further investigation.
The Role of Facial Expression
Our framework assumes that appetitive attitudes are immediate
outcomes of consuming the advertising stimuli. Throughout,
we forwarded the proposition that facial expression predicts
attitudes rather than the other way around. Hence, smiling at
an advertisement means you like it more. However, situations
are conceivable in which appetitive attitudes may cause increased
facial expressions of happiness. Short-term appetitive attitudes
could potentially develop into long-term ones, becoming a
priori beliefs about an ad or brand resulting from repeated
exposure to the ad. Consequently, any time the ad is presented,
beliefs are automatically activated, instigating the appropriate
facial expressions. The attitudes considered in our studies have
only immediate post-viewing appetitive attitudes within their
scope. Predictive effects of longer-term a priori beliefs on facial
expression are left unaccounted for.
However, the empirical studies reviewed did throw a
consistent light on the direction of causality in the case of
immediate viewing effects. We were faced initially with a causal
direction issue: do I smile because I like an object or, conversely,
do I like it because I smile? Lewinski et al. (2015, February) tested
the latter possibility thoroughly and found it held up to scrutiny.
Thus, we are confident to add to the literature on facial feedback a
strong case for facial expression as a causal condition for affective,
immediate, and post-viewing liking responses.
Advantages of Measuring Facial Expressions
An often-used method to assess how consumers react upon
amusing advertising is to explicitly ask them what they think
about an advertisement and how they think they feel about
it. However, asking people directly how they feel is not
only cognitively demanding and difficult for the subject, that
interrogative pathway also brings undesired effects into the
mix, such as increased self-awareness (Pryor et al., 1977) and
social-desirability (Arnold and Feldman, 1981). Moreover, as self-
report measures they are incapable of capturing a number of
biologically anchored emotional expressions that are inaccessible
to the subject’s awareness. Physiological registrations can offer
a solution to the shortcomings of explicit verbal measures of
cognitive and emotional states. One such physiological measure
is facial emotional expressions, which play a prominent role in
our model and hence help in overcoming such disadvantages
of self-reported emotions. Further automated coding of such
expressions, with software such as FaceReader, eliminates the
human factor in coding, which often can be less accurate, under
certain conditions than coding algorithms (see Lewinski, 2015b),
trained on objective material (such as in Olszanowski et al.,
2015).
Practical Implications
Consumer Competence
Embodied resistance to persuasion aims to increase consumer
competence by empowering them with additional resistance
“tools” to counteract deliberate persuasive attempts that
use amusement. The insights into embodied resistance to
persuasion are relevant for consumers, consumers’ interest
groups and governmental and non-governmental consumer
policy organizations. Consumer organizations, too, have empha-
sized the need for tools that help consumers to act autonomously
when they are faced with consumer product supplies. The
European consumer organization BEUC (Bureau Européen
des Unions de Consommateurs), which represents more than
four million consumers from a few dozen national consumer
organizations across thirty-one European countries, has explicitly
stated:
“Empowering consumers is the holy grail of current EU
strategy and research. It is also a policy target for national
governments, often in tandem with policies for smarter regulation
or deregulation. It means that consumers take decisions and
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choices into their own hands where they can – provided that
they have the right tools to do so. (. . .). If the 500 million
EU consumers have all [right tools], they can influence markets
with their collective power. (. . .). The reality, however, as
our members tell us, is rather different. Numerous elements
converge to disempower consumers (. . .). Too often companies
make deliberate use of consumer information fatigue and their
behavioral biases in their communication strategy” (The European
Consumer Organisation [BEUC], 2012, p. 7; “EU Consumers’
2020 Vision,” emphasis added).
In a consumer context, embodied resistance to persuasion
holds promise as a tool empowering consumers and thus
adding to their competence. The behavioral control that it
involves adds to available elements of consumer competence
such as counter-arguing or attitude bolstering. In addition, for
special groups of consumers who for one reason or another
cannot efficiently resist appealing messages through counter-
arguing or attitude bolstering, the body may be the only easily
accessible resource for resisting persuasion. This is because one
prominent advantage of embodied resistance to persuasion as
a strategy is that it applies to behavioral expression in the first
place.
Disadvantaged Groups
Specifically, consumers who are not proficient in generic
resistance to persuasion and have difficulty dealing with cognitive
instructions well can benefit from instruction to control
their bodily expressions. For example, instructing such regular
consumers to feign a specific facial expression, e.g., lowering
their brows could help them to resist persuasion attempts.
They might interpret their bodily act of brow lowering as the
physical manifestation of their own thinking, possibly enhancing
cognitive performance.
Consider that a young child who cannot yet counter-argue a
persuasive message is already able to inhibit his or her smiling
at an appealing object. Parents could show their child how
to suppress facial expressions of happiness in response to a
tempting ad, whereas they could not make the child comprehend
and follow a verbal instruction to counter-argue the message.
Parents can guide children in resisting persuasive messages by
demonstrating how to counteract persuasion using their body.
This assumption stems from and would be compatible with
the findings from the well-known still-face paradigm in mother
infant-interaction (Tronick et al., 1979). The still face of the
mother (an extreme case of incompatible mimicry) provokes
clearly negative reactions in the infants, including withdrawal.
Marketing Communication
Understanding embodied resistance to persuasion may not
only inform pro-consumer institutions but also advertising
agencies and corporate units of market or consumer behavior
analysis. For example, ad copy testing could include measures
of behavioral expressiveness to check whether consumers engage
in embodied resistance to persuasion. Integrated marketing
communication could deliver customized experiences based on
consumers’ embodied response profiles. That is, they should
address consumers taking into account individual differences
among them with regard to the non-verbal expression of
emotions. In addition, the insights proposed based on our
framework lead us to recommend salespersons acting in face-
to-face situations to capitalize on naturally occurring mimicry
responses of their audience. They should be able to influence
purchase decisions of consumers by exhibiting facial expressions
that when mimicked by the consumer, would increase their
appetitive attitudes. Studies by van Baaren et al. (2003), Wang
(2009) hint at such possibilities.
Our work is also relevant to marketers and advertisers who
we know are using various “resistance-neutralizing tactics (. . .)
tailored to the specific resistance strategy that is adopted by
consumers” (Fransen et al., 2015b, p. 5). Marketers can benefit
from understanding the mechanism behind the new consumer
resistance strategy that we propose here.
LIMITATIONS AND DIRECTIONS FOR
FUTURE RESEARCH
At least two exciting new avenues for the theoretical extensions
of our framework open up thanks to the presentation of the
basic premises of embodied resistance to persuasion in this
paper. First, the consideration of the role of potential moderating
factors in the causal paths of embodied resistance to persuasion
is warranted. Below, in the limitations section, we identify as
likely candidates motivation, persuasion knowledge, advertising
skepticism, and emotion regulation as a trait. Second, to further
develop the embodiment part of the framework, various modes
of expression of emotion should be elaborated upon in more
detail. That also means that the suppression of additional
modes of expressing the emotion could have different, additive,
multiplying, or no effects at all.
Spontaneous Embodied Resistance to
Persuasion
One significant limitation of our framework is that we ignore
the role of consumers’ motivation to resist the ads. Some people
may believe, for instance, that they are not affected by the ads,
so they do not have to resist them. The existence of such a
belief could be explained by the third-person effect (Davison,
1983), which argues that “a person exposed to a persuasive
communication in the mass media sees this as having a greater
effect on others than on himself or herself ” (p. 1). Further,
another issue related to the role of motivation to resist is people’s
persuasion knowledge (Friestad and Wright, 1994) and their
skepticism toward advertising (Obermiller and Spangenberg,
1998). Embodied resistance to persuasion could predominantly
be a tool used by consumers with above average knowledge of
persuasive communication strategies, or who are skeptical of
advertising in general. Also environments that cue different types
of motivation (e.g., telic or paratelic; see e.g., Lewinski, 2015d)
could have different effects on the resistance.
Yet another concept that dovetails with consumers’
motivation to resist the ad in our model is emotion regulation
as a stable trait. Emotion regulation is not only a temporal
strategy moldable and sensitive to instruction, but also a chronic
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trait (Gross and John, 2003) measured through statements like,
“When I want to feel more positive emotion (such as joy or
amusement), I change what I’m thinking about” or “When I am
feeling positive emotions, I am careful not to express them.” The
evidence that is presented so far is restricted to strategies induced
by instruction. For future studies it might be interesting to
consider if spontaneous, and not instructed, emotion regulation
stemming from, for example, individual differences would be
equally effective in resisting advertisements.
Finally, an important question is left open. Under which
conditions is an embodied resistance to persuasion strategy more
effective than a “standard” strategy? Going even further, can
we hypothesize that under some conditions, engaging in both
kinds of resistance at the same time would offer the greatest
benefit to the consumer? However, interesting as a possibility,
this hypothesis remains to be supported by further research and
conceptualizations.
Other Forms of Expression of Emotion
In this paper, we did not consider the role of expression of
emotion outside of facial expressions, though our framework
allows for such possibilities. Alternative forms could encompass
a head-down (sadness), clenched fist (anger), or straightened
posture (pride). For example, sadness and anger are clearly
negative emotions (Ekman et al., 1983) and should therefore
decrease positive attitudes toward an entertaining advertisement.
However, pride is an ambiguous emotion that is likely positive
but also qualitatively different from, e.g., happiness and hence
belonging to the same category as self-conscious emotions like
embarrassment, shame, and guilt (Lewis, 2000). Thus, whether
straightened posture would lead to lower or higher positive
attitudes cannot be decided a priori. We did not consider those
expressions because there is no automated way to code for them
at any larger scale, a prerequisite for quantifying and interpreting
significance and we could not have potentially generated enough
empirical support to justify inclusion of those components
explicitly in our model.
Further, e.g., Sweldens et al. (2010) showed that resistance
instructions can counter explicit attitudes (and such were
measured in the presented experimental data) but still influence
implicit attitudes. This question is left open in our framework. It
could be that emotion regulation, even though inhibiting facial
expression would not further dampen implicit attitudes, i.e.,
attitudes captured by response time, IAT, galvanic skin response
or other neuromarketing measures (such as fMRI or EEG),
not filtered by any conscious verbalization process. However,
because facial expression is itself a type of an implicit response
in that sense, we predict that emotion regulation could be
equally effective for resisting persuasion at an implicit attitude
level. We think this is an exciting area to investigate in the
future.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Commercials aiming to persuade are ubiquitous and making
consumers aware of how to use their body in resisting
these unwanted temptations could contribute to consumers’
empowerment. Embodied emotion regulation may be advocated
as a novel and effective strategy to resist persuasion. To
conclude, the working of embodied resistance to persuasion
contributes to the growing scientific evidence that consumers’
bodily feedback has powerful regulatory effects on their behavior.
In particular, our work highlights the role of bodily feedback
in consumer resistance to persuasive ads. The downplaying of
one’s emotional reactivity by either suppression or reappraisal
empowers consumers, namely by helping them resist persuasive
messages. We believe that embodied resistance to persuasion
opens up a new avenue for persuasion research, showing that
bodily emotion regulation mediated through facial behavior
influences attitudes. In short, what we bodily express, influences
not only how we feel and think but also whether or not we are
persuaded.
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